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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XIV DECEMBER, 1928 NUMBER 1
THE PUBLIC UTILITY: A PROBLEM IN
SOCIAL ENGINEERING*
GUSTAVUS H. ROBINSONt
The blurring of lines in the biological sciences is adverted to in a
recent report of the President of Harvard University. If there is
a difficulty in dividing off botany from zoology there is similar diffi-
culty in the social sciences.' As to what is law and what politics
there has been discussion both judicial and juristic.2 But on the in-
quiry what is "law" and what is "economics" and where lies the line
between them there has been little enough discussion. To define law
is no easy job3 for the lawyers but they are perhaps no worse off in
that respect than are the economists in defining their specialty.4
Of the latter the root idea, says the Century dictionary, is thrifty
management, originally of the household merely, now the thrifty
management of the means of living-of the arts by which human
needs and comforts are supplied. With the general process of making
man's material environment subject to his purposes-an engineering
problem in the physical sense--the lawyer has nothing to do. But the
recognition and regulation of the relationships of men to things and
to one another with respect to those things, is the essential field
*The substance of this article was delivered as a lecture at the Robert Brookings
Graduate School of Economics and Government, Washington, D.C. The notes
are added for this publication.
tProfessor of Law, Boston University Law School.
'The Columbia University announcement of "Courses in the Social Sciences"
includes "History," "Economics," "Geography," "Government and Public
Law," "Sociology," and "Law," which last is the Law School Curriculum. Cf.
OGBURN and GOLDENWEISER, THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THEIR INTERRE-
LATIONS (1927). See the reviews of this book by Munro in (1928) 22 Am. POL.
ScI. REv. 188; and by Morgan in (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 391.
2Weston, Political Questions (1924) 38 HARV. L. REv. 296; Hedges, Justiciable
Disputes (1928) 22 AM. JOUR. OF INT. LAw, 56o.
2Isaacs, The Schools of Jurisprudence (1918) 31 HARV. L. REV. 373; See chapter
on "The Nature of Law" POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES IN JURISPRUDENCE
(3d ed. 1920) 56-78.
4See the heading on "Political Economy" 3 INGLIS, PALGRAVES DICTIONARY
OF POLITICIAL ECONOMY (Higg's ed. 1926) 128 et seg.
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of the law. It is in the institution, the maintenance, and the manage-
ment of those relations, that the distinctions between law and eco-
nomics defy detection.
Yet the problem "How shall those arrangements be made and how
managed when they are made?" is a question which every society
must face. It isa"social engineering" job-to use the languageof the
sociological jurist.5 His point of view invites me to ask you to con-
ceive of Society-with a big S-sitting down, a la :Rodin's thinker, and
registering, as the movies say, concentration on this idea. "I am
12o,ooo,ooo people, the United States of America; or I am 6,ooo,ooo
people, New York City. My job is to arrange for the needs of the
millions. Food will have to be raised, water secured, housing and
clothes provided, transportation established, distributive processes,
banking, amusement, etc. provided for. The millions will discover
new things to want and those will have to be dealt with. Also they
will call for the establishment and maintenance of good order and for
some scheme for the amicable settlement of internal disputes. For
the present they will want the wherewithal to prosecute the settle-
ment by violence of the external ones. This last means policing,
courts, and war establishment. How shall I arrange to get all these
things done?" If Society has had any conscious thought about this I
do not know it, but society has in fact taken several differently
labelled methods of securing service for the million.
It has erected a sovereign corporation out of itself, called the result
"the government," and has had the government undertake to do
some of the things, charging the million roundly for the job in the
form of taxes. What shall be done by this agency is a form of social
engineering.
The list of things done by government has gone through a vast
expansion from the original undertaking to keep the peace and to
substitute for private war the orderly settlement of disputes by com-
pelled arbitration in state-maintained tribunals. That government
has become an indulgent grandmother to the human incompetent is
5See chapter on "An Engineering Interpretation" PouND, INTERPRETATIONS OF
LEGAL HISTORY (1923) at 152-165. Of theother schools theso-called "analytical"
concerns itself with what is. Of why this rather than that, and of whether "this"
suits the present conditions, it makes little question. The "social engineering"
phrase is no part of its jargon. In the "historical school" social engineering is
evolutionary, and slow time figures more than positive action seeking to modify.
But the "sociological" jurist is an engineer by preference. To him the past is a
lesson rather than a command; and he tests received institutions by the needs of
now. If in his estimate of the now a better should be devised for now he sets him-
self the duty of doing it by conscious effort.
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not an unknown remark in these piping days. To test the quality
of the government-purveyed product as against that purveyed by
private methods, and to compute the comparative costs would be a
neat inquiry all by itself. Frank Stockton in "The Great American
War Syndicate"' years ago showed, fancifully, how much more
effectively and how much more cheaply a war could be waged by
business men who bought the war "on spec" than the government
could do it. The government monopoly of peddling authoritative
settlement of disputes has run the cost so far up and the quality
of the product so far down that the commercial interests, at least,
have found arbitration among themselves preferable. 7 They have also
found private policing more satisfactory-see private armored cars
for banks.
One cannot talk social engineering without a reference to what
society might or might not best do for itself through government;
but since government is unregulated for efficiency, and for cost,
either by competition or by positive interference, in any such sense
as are the other methods which society takes to get things done
for the millions, "social engineering" in the very largest sense, limps
at the start, for plain lack of information. And that is a charitable
way of stating the case.
The other method is "private enterprise"; whereby society con-
trives to fool certain individuals into the belief that by harnessing
themselves into some treadmill they are working for themselves.
But at bottom it seems pretty clear that the man who runs a de-
partment store, or makes automobiles or bakes bread for sale is
under the operation of a social engineering device to get the million
supplied. That private property is basically a social institution, is I
believe, one of the tenets of economists nowadays; but Sir William
6The story deals with the efficient and bloodless victory won promptly as per
contract by a group of business men.
7The drift away from settlement by state-maintained agency to mere state
enforcement of settlement arrived at privately, is set forth in various recent
articles. See Cohen and Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law (1926) 12
VA. L. REV. 265: "A step in a movement of growing momentum," of which the
"origin (is) in ... congestion of the courts... and in the delay, expense, and
technicality of litigation" and "which commands an unusually widespread
support in the business world." Jones, Historical Development of Commercial
Arbitration in the United States (1928) 12 MINN. L. REV. 240, where Mr. Jones
traces the legislation: New York in 1920; in 1923 New Jersey; in 1925 Federal
and Oregon; Massachusetts 1927; California, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Utah, Wyoming, redently.
See also Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law (1928) 37 YALE
L. J. 59s.
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Blackstone was there or thereabouts with the same idea in the
seventeen fifties.8
In this discussion the category "private enterprise" is set off from
the service undertaken by government. This separation, of "govern-
ment" and "private," is based on who does the business. But when I
come to define my terms further, I reach a nomenclature which may
puzzle the non lawyer: for "private business," as distinguished from
governmental, the law divides into two classes one of which it labels
"public business." The epithet "public" is tacked on to distinguish
the private business which is regulated from the private business
which is not-and which might be called "private private" business.
This is the jargon, but "private private" business gets much regulat-
ing of one sort or another, in these days.9 Indeed I shall have to
subdivide this public private business itself, for a "public business"' 1
is not always regulated beyond price fixing; while a"public utility"
is subject to a variety of duties and they are cast into uniform lines
8See chapter on "The Social Theory of Private Property" ELY, PROPERTY AND
WEALTH (i914) 165-199. At 206 he says: "The police power is the power of the
courts to interpret the concept property, and above all private property; and to
establish its metes and bounds," and "to give the concept a content at each par-
ticular period in our development which fits it to serve the general welfare."
Blackstone says: "But when mankind increased in number, craft, and
ambition, it became necessary to entertain conceptions of more permanent
dominion and to appropriate to individuals. . . the very substance . . .other-
wise innumerable tumults must have arisen, and the good order of the world be
continually broken and disturbed..." Thus he bases it on the social interest in
security. 2 BL. COMM. C. I, at 4.
9in a recent article, Bevis, Administrative Commissions and the Administration
of Justice (1928) 2 U. CIN. L. RZEv. I, at 6 et seg., the author shows the amount of
regulation of the "private" business. See CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BusiNEss
(1926), reviewed (1927) 13 ST. Louis L. REv. 33.
10Taft, C. J., in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S.
522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630 (1923): "To say that a business is clothed with a public
interest, is not to determine what regulation may be permissible in view of the
private rights of the owner. The extent to which an inn or a cab system may be
regulated may differ widely from that allowable as to a railroad or other common
carrier. It is not a matter of legislative discretion solely. It depends on the
nature of the business, on the feature which touches the public, and on the abuses
reasonably to be feared. To say that a business is clothed with a public interest
is not to import that the public may take over its entire management and run it
at the expense of the owner. The extent to which regulation may reasonably
go varies with different kinds of business." The test of how much regulation will
be put up with, constitutionally, is unpredictable in advance of the very situ-
ation presented. Circumstances and conditions,-"fact situations" in the newer
jargon,--make the law, and only society's needs tomorrow can determine what
tomorrow's law will be.
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and are enforced by similar devices. I am making my definition of
"public utility" by building up a summary of these duties and these
regulatory devices, and using the phrase "public utility" as an
epitomising label.
Society, if it acts consciously, will first ask itself: Having choice
of securing service to the million by government action directly,
by simple "private" enterprise, or by this private public enterprise,
which method, shall be used to secure what services? More partic-
ularly, so far as this article is concerned, what phases of the business
of purveying to the million shall be committed to private public
business, this mule among the draft animals? Secondly, if we select
a private business to be characterized by special public duties to the
million, what duties in their behalf shall be imposed? These are
the primary inquiries; but, as in other engineering, the engineers had
to ask whether the machinery at hand was suitable for the achieve-
ment of the job of assuring enforcement of the duties imposed.
As it turned out, there was a necessity for new machinery in the law.
The virtues of the common law court, its one-at-a-time method, the
safeguards against arbitrariness which slowed its tempo, became
defects. The common law court proved unable to handle the job
and a new engine-the administrative commission-was introduced.
But the union which understood the old machinery-the lawyers and
the judges composed it-was as hostile to the new machinery as most
other unions have been to innovations in their tools. Legislatures, too,
have not always understood its function, as I shall later show. In
the scheme of legal apparatus the commission has reached no such
placement as the courts have reached; but necessity, which was its
mother, works for its ultimate acceptance on comparable terms."
"On the necessity for utility commissions an eminent judgesays: "Therewasa
time in the history of this country when carriers and public-service corporations
were so few that the legislature itself might have performed that labor; but by
reason of the rapid growth of population and the great increase in the number
of such corporations, it has become impracticable for the legislature to discharge
that duty. Moreover, many rates may require alteration from time to time.
That the most appropriate method (speaking from a practical, not necessarily
constitutional, point of view) is the creation of a commission or body of experts
to determine the particular rates, has been said several times in the opinions
rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States in the various railroad-
commission cases and in those of state courts.
It would be almost impossible for the Legislature of this state to undertake
intelligent regulation of utility corporations by the Legislature itself." Cullen,
C. J., in Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas etc. Co., i91 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693
(1908). See also Idaho Power Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho, 222, 41 Pac. 1083
(1914).
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So far I have been dealing with the subject fancy free and fanci-
fully. None of the matters I have listed were actually handled in any
such fashion as I have outlined. No one ever sat down and'said "Go
to, now, we shall consider these things with an Olympian view." For
that the sociological jurist is too recent an arrival, even if his leader-
ship were thoroughly accepted. As Holmes, not yet a justice of
the Supreme Court, long ago put it, "The life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience." And experience builds as do the polyps
whose remains form the atolls. It adds a little here, a little there; and
in time an institution emerges which is rationalized after the emer-
gence. So long as the law grew only by decision, case added to case
built, in the end, a mass in which common ideas could be sorted out.
Symmetry was no part of the result. Only in recent years when
legislation became the growing point has there been a plan and a form
projected in advance.
The first of our special questions, "What services to the million
shall be secured by the hybrid private public enterprise?" Society has
answered in no terms of formula. The Supreme Court of the United
States, which makes the final expression, has been content to reply
"We can best explain by examples,' 1 2 reciting the list of what had
been decided. As a test for application to what has not yet been
decided it offers a jingle of words which one of its members says
"is little more than a fiction intended to beautify what is disagreeable
to the sufferers" (i.e. those private enterprises which are decided to
be "public"); and which another says "is too vague and illusory to
carry us very far.'1 3 On the other hand a professor in a leading
business school opens his recent book with the statement that the
concept is "simple. '4 -
No discussion of mine, however, or of anyone else, can omit the
disparaged jingle. It dates from the famous case of Munn v. Illinois
in 187615 which marks the modem development of the topic. The
IMcKenna, J., in German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup.
Ct. 612 (i914), in holding that insurance was an enterprise "so far affected with a
public interest" as to justify legislative regulation of its rates.
'
3These phrases, by Justices Holmes and Stone, are from a recent decision
holding that the New York statute which limited to fifty cents the service of
the theatre ticket agencies was unconstitutional: Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S.
418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927). By a five to four vote the Supreme Court rejected
the legislature's assertion that "the price ... for admission to theatres ... is a
matter affected with a public interest."
a4Philip Cabot of the Harvard School so opens his book PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC
UTILITY MANAGEMENT (1927).
1594 U. S. 113 (1876). Against its fact situation the decision is readily cast into
terms of social engineering.
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question was whether an Illinois statute fixing rates to be charged by
grain elevators was valid. Munn's elevator had been in operation
long before the statute; but the court, which comes into the matter
because social engineering is conceived to be a constitutional question
under the Fourteenth Amendment, assured Munn that when "pri-
vate property is affected with a public interest it ceases to be juris
privati only"; and that "Property does become clothed with a public
interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence and
affect the community at large." These phrases are the jingle of words.
As Mr. Chief Justice Taft puts it in a recent decision" "They (the
businesses) have come to hold such a peculiar relation to the public
that this (the label "clothed with a public interest" )is superimposed
on them. In the language of the cases the owner by devoting his
business to the public use in effect grants the public an interest in
that use and subjects himself to public regulation."
As the "devoting "is simply offering to do business with the million
this obviously leaves entirely unexplained why Munn, the Chicago
elevator man, fell under regulation while Marshall Field, the dry-
goods man, did not. Obviously the decision was not with Munn or
with Field. The public-society itself-as judge of its own interest,
decides when the necessary consequence is arrived at and the com-
munity at large is affected. In Munn's case the facts played the
deciding part. Grain production was localizing itself in the Middle
West. But grain consumption is everywhere; and its movement
became a major social interest. Rivers of grain flowed through
Chicago and Munn's elevator was part of the neck of the grain bottle
at Chicago.
What are the limitations upon Society in selecting this private
"public business" method of assuring services to the million, Munn
asks. His "private "status he holds precariously. That is all you can
tell him. Felt needs of society overtake him when society feels the
needs.17
Of course this switching out of the private into the public class is
not as arbitrary in practice as it is in the phrase. The track upon
which the thing has run has been on the analogy to the "carrier";
and in 1914, years after the Munn decision, a justice of the Supreme
Court18 could say of the "public business" group up to his day "they
all have direct relation to the business or facilities of transportation
16Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra note io.
17This comes pretty close to an epitome of legal history generally. It is a.pro-
gression in the assertion of social interests at the expense of individual "rights."
18Lamar dissenting in German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, supra note 12.
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or distribution-to transportation by carriers of passengers, goods, or
intelligence by vehicle or wire;-to distribution of -water, gas or
electricity through ditch, pipe or wire; to wharfage, storage or ac-
commodation to property before the journey begins, when it ends, or
along the way., When thus enumerated, they appear to be grouped
around the common carrier as the typical public business." In time,
however, the analogy to the carrier grew too tenuous for use as a
restraining device. Now the only safeguard for individualism, or the
only hurdle for state control,-as you chance to see it-is the Supreme
Court's conviction on the question whether or not the sufficient
consequence to the community has been reached. If I knew what
"economic" meant I would say it was one of pure economic fact.
With the Supreme Court as a checking device the "law" with
respect to this phase of our social engineering is fairly workable if you
are not afraid of trusting somebody with power. In the last analysis
the whole matter is actually in the discretion of the court, for discre-
tion hides in formulas meaningless until decision gives them a content
for the occasion. There is an unpredictability, of course. It nettles
the type of mind which wants "a strict rule of law" as a yardstick for
the future and which distrusts judicial freelancing. My own reaction
is a sense of admiration divided between a nation of one hundred and
twenty million which sees the need for freelancing and trusts nine
men with the job of exercising it; and the nine men for having exer-
cised it with such general satisfaction to their mandators. The un-
willingness of the present nine to be convinced by the "economic"
facts presented in some recent cases has been subject to remark 9
but it only proves that in this matter, as in so many others in economic
thinking, there is an ebb and a flow in the tide of belief in panacea.
In our political structure-that is of Federal and State components
-the state is the unit of Society which, as a rule of fact, does the
social engineering; and, though the development of the "public
business" category out of the carrier analogy was a judicial job, it is
the legislature which now tells Munn-in the generic sense-"You
are a public business." The courts, up to the Supreme Court of the
United States, merely review the declaration. "The circumstances of
its alleged change from the status of a private business and its free-
19See Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court (1927)
40 HAxv. L. REv. 943. He says: "...it is somewhat of a shock to discover that
in the six years since 1920 the Supreme Court has declared social and economic
legislation unconstitutional under the due process clauses of either the Fifth
or the Fourteenth Amendment in more cases than in the entire fifty-two years
during which the Fourteenth Amendment had been in effect."
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dom from regulation into one in which the public have come to have
an interest are always a subject of a judicial inquiry. '" 20 Legislative
declaration that insurance was public has been accepted; that housing
was public was accepted as an "emergency measure." But declara-
tion that coal mining, that clothing making, that meat packing,
were public, failed to convince the court. Its latest refusal to be
convinced had to do with amusements. It said "no" in a five to four
division in which four opinions were filed. The decision can be stated
only in terms of result, and the result is another illustration of
unpredictability as to the content which will be given to loose formu-
las and of the play of the accident of judicial personnel upon institu-
tions. One man's different reaction to the fact situation would have
made new social history.
Having thus pursued my inquiry "What is a public business?" into
an answer2 ' which recalls Boswell's inquiry about supporting a bad
case, to which Johnson replied "Sir, you do not know it to be good or
bad until the Judge determines it", I ask now, if the legislative
labelling "publicness" for this or that business theretofore "private",
sticks with the judiciary, what obligations to Society-with a big S-
are bound up in the label? A favorite trick of the lawyers is to battle
over the label to stick on a thing and to assume, when the ticketing
is established, that the label itself describes in epitome a set of
characteristics. My definition of a "public utility", however, is
built up from the characteristics, for the consequences which attach
to the label "public business" are a problem in social engineering; and
the "public businesses" therefore are not necessarily put under the
same service duties. This Chief Justice Taft points out when he says
"To say that a business is clothed with a public interest, is not to
determine what regulation may be permissible in view of the private
rights of the owner. The extent to which an inn or a cab system may
be regulated may differ widely from that allowable as to a railroad or
other common carrier. It depends on the nature of the business, on
the feature which touches the public, and on the abuses reasonably to
be feared."
The key to the matter is in the last part of the quotation. Society
puts these or those public duties on this or that enterprise with
20Taft, C. J., in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra note
Io.
21in an article in (1928) 41 HARV. L. REV. 277, the author devotes some thirty
pages to The Public Utility Concept in American Law, and on the question "what
is a public utility?" answers, "As to what the Supreme Court has passed on I can
look it up: as to what it may be newly asked to pass on I shall wait and see."
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reference to the needs of the million as the needs are seen. I have
sought to define a "public utility" narrowly as that type of business
labelled "public" upon which society imposes common and standard-
ized duties and enforces their performance by the agency of the
Commission.Y Yet I can scarcely say that among even these busi-
nesses the same duties are enforced with the same emphasis as to all
of them.
Definition is difficult. The whole field is modem. From the various
topics which, in the law school curriculum, present it incidentally, it
is only just being segregated into a "subject" which itself commands a
place in the catalogue. The name "public utilities" dates only from
1899 (Harvard). It does not yet describe a coursewhich all law schools
teach, or which in the schools which give it the student is afraid not
to take. Indeed, "public utilities" is not in the law in the sense that
under that heading one may find in index and in digest all the enter-
prises and topics which belong to it. The searcher is driven to
"administrative law", "automobiles", "carriers", "commissions",
"constitutional law", "electricity", "gas", "inns", "negligence",
"pipe lines", "railroads", "shipping", "street railways", "taxicabs",
"telegraphs", "telephones", "water companies." Only as all these
are taken together does one get the synth6sising sense of a unity
which underlies their apparent isolation. This discussion attempts
to see it whole; to set for "public utilities" a form and content.
I should be a rash prophet indeed if I asserted that the social
engineering has cast any of the public businesses in final and un-
alterable lines. Both publicness and the incidents of publicness
represent a response by a social order to its own problems as it sees
them. When the carrier was the public utility-before the rise of the
present types-the public interest made itself felt most in respect to
the duties to the person for whom service was actually undertaken.
Society then emphasized the so-called insurer liability of the carrier
for goods entrusted to him. Only the extremities of hard luck re-
lieved him of responsibility for their loss. "Act of God" act of the
public enemy would do. Lesser happenings would not. "Act of God,"
however, was so loosely defined as to leave large play for judicial
2This leaves out of the strict "public utility" class of public enterprises the in-
surance business, the house renting business etc., where the public interest as so
far sensed has merely demanded price fixing, and not also the elaborate regulatory
schemes for securing service which have been worked out for those within the nar-
rower definition.
Professor Henry Rottschaefer has lately examined Tie Field of Governmental
price Control (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 438.
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discretion. This phase bulks less largely today when probably most
carriage is under limited liability.
Recent public interest has lain more in the defining and the en-
forcement of duties conceived of as owing to those who seek to become
customers, and modem "public utility law" is largely in this field. It
leaves the utility's duties to those who actually become customers to
be governed by principles which are general in the law and which base
liability in the large, upon the magic word "negligence." The newer
outlook deprives the customer and the utility alike, in dealing with
each other, of contractual powers. They may agree only to be in con-
sensual relationship-more accurately, the customer may agree; the
option is his. The utility must agree. It is the utility's duty to serve
him. They may not also agree, as in ordinary contract, on the terms
and incidents of the relationship into which they enter, for these are
set by the public authority itself. They are stated as duties upon the
utility but the social interest imposes duties upon the customer not to
"contract" for others.
Accepting the narrower "public utility" definition and accepting
also the general statement as to the shift in emphasis just made, it be-
comes now appropriate to detail and to discuss the special duties to
the million which the present social engineering establishes. First,
Munn-using as a type name the earliest of the modern victims of the
soothing phrase which Justice Holmes refers to-himself decides
whether or not he will assume to serve the million at all, and in what
business he will serve. Society, so far as we know it at any rate, has
not undertaken to say to unwilling Munns "You sell transportation"
or "You sell gas" etc' If Munn may not, on the one hand, be
dragooned into service, his offer to give it need not, on the other hand
be accepted. Of course, this was always true, and still is true in the
nThere is no case where any such thing has been tried ab initio, so to speak.
But there are cases where one selling transportation "privately" has been protect-
ed from Society's order to sell it "publicly." Unless the entrepreneur himself
elects to sell "publicly" he cannot be made to do so. The cases are those of
persons having contracts with automobile manufacturers to carry the parts made
in various factories to an assembling plant, Mich. Pub. U. Comm. v. Duke,
266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct. 191 (1925); or with motion picture houses to carry
films about among them, Film Transport Co. v. Mich. P. U. Comm, i7 F. (2d)
857 (E. D. Mich., 1927); or with dairy associations to bring milk in from the
farms to the creamery, Hissem v. Guran, 112 Ohio St. 59, 146 N. E. 808 (i918).
California's attempt to exact "publicness" as a price for the use of the highways
was defeated in Frost v. R. R. Comm., 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605 (1926).
Protection is also accorded a utility against being forced into a service-demand-
ing area which is not part of the area to which the utility devoted its service,
A. T. S. F. R. Co. v. R. R. Comm., 173 Calif. 577, 16o Pac. 828 (i916).
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sense that individual customers need not buy his service. But the
present view means more than that. Before he starts business at all
he must now get public permission to seek customers.
The social interest in this respect was not sensed till lately. A
Society grounded in the twin faiths of the blessings of competition
and of individualism did not see that the planting of two blades of
industrial grass in a soil which in the business sense could nourish but
one, might cost the million more in money than would one, and give
them little or no service from either. The parallelings in the railroad
map of the country is the explanation of many railroad receiverships;
and the present Congressional insistence upon consolidation is an
attempt at efficiency and economy under bigness where littleness and
competition once reigned. Quick expansion of population in a new
country, for a time absorbed in some measure the extravagances of
optimism, but the last few years have accustomed us to a birth control
pigeonholed under the title of the Requirement of a Certificate of
Public Convenience.2 4
The theory is stated by a judge who sees Society arranging service
for the million more cheaply and getting it better by the use of one
rather than of several competing plants. "An existing utility has
already expended, say, $i,ooo,ooo in the power plant and transmission
lines and distribution system in a town. Another utility, coming in,
must also provide a power plant and transmission lines and a distribu-
ting system. If there is to be unrestricted competition, then the
later distributing system must cover the same area as that of the
older one. If it costs the same money then there is an additional
$x,ooo,ooo expended in a town where a $i,ooo,ooo system would be
amply sufficient. .. . Therefore the rates paid by the people must
be upon $2,000,000, instead of upon $i,ooo,oooif the utilities are to be
given a fair return on their investments. ... It is for the benefit of
the public that the highest efficiency be obtained from a public
utility and that it serve the public at the lowest cost, and such an end
cannot be reached if the community is served by duplicate plants....
a duplication is a waste if resources and an extra tax on the people."
Is not this a recognition not only of a social interest in securing service
24There has been a great deal of recent writing on this topic. See Hardman,
The Changing Law of Competition in Public Service--Another Word (1928) 34
W. VA. L. Q. 123, x83. See also Lilienthal and Rosenbaum, Motor Carrier
Regulation by Certificates of Necessity and Convenience (1926) 36 YAI L. J. 163.
The same authors have dealt with Motor Carrier Regulation Federal, State, and
Municipal (1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 954; In Illinois, (1927) 22 ILL. L. REV. 47;
In Ohio, (1927) i U. CiNN. L. REV. 288; and in Pennsylvania, (1927) 75 U. PA.
L. REv. 696.
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to the million cheaply, but also in not allowing the assets of current
society as a whole to be wastefully invested?
All this of course applies only to businesses which as to their kind
are already "public utilities." If the public utility definition were
suddenly expanded to include food selling, clothing or fuel selling, as
Kansase5 sought a few years ago to expand it, we should face the urge
to exclude the already incompetent Munns already in the field. A
chopping off of heads would no doubt be too revolutionary to be
constitutional so long as competitive conditions would bring prompt
demises; but since the public utility label connotes price-fixing, which
reduces competition to competition only in service, the high cost to
society of the lingering deaths could supply a very neat problem of
social engineering in the interest of efficient service.
However, let us assume that Munn-a corporate Munn usually
nowadays-wants to do a public utility business and he gets his
certificate, and goes into business; what has the social engineering of
the present required of him? I shall list the duties first and discuss
them seriatim. To the prospective customers the duties are (i) to
serve all, (2) to serve without discrimination, (3) to serve with ade-
quate facilities, (4) to continue service, (5) to serve with reasonable
rates. As to the duties to the individual for whom service is actually
undertaken i.e. as to the obligation in service as distinguished from
the duty to serve, there is no single answer applicable for all the
utilities. There has been variance in time with regard to the carrier
whose case has been most specially treated. Until lately he has been
as already stated an "insurer" of their value, of the safety of goods; 26
he is still, factually speaking, pretty close to an insurer as to the
human package, the passenger.2
7
25In this the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States went against
Kansas: Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, supra note 1O; s. C., 267 U. S.
552, 45 Sup. Ct. 441 (1925); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 44 Sup. Ct. 323
(1924). The whole matter was discussed by the writer in The Public Utility Con-
cept in American Law (1928) 41 HARV. L. REV. 277.
26The modern policy lets him operate on a limited valuation. "If a common
carrier gives to a shipper the choice of two rates the lower of them conditioned
upon his agreeing to a stipulated valuation of his property in case of loss, even
by the carrier's negligence, if the shipper makes such a choice, understandingly
and freely, and names his valuation, he cannot thereafter recover more than
the value which he thus places upon his property." Union Pacific R.. R.. v.
Burke, 255 U. S. 317, 41 Sup. Ct. 283 (1921). This is the Federal rule. Some
States have not allowed the modification, but seventy-five to eighty per cent
of the freight movement is interstate.
27The language of the cases justifies no such statement as that. Except as to
the assaults and wrong doings of the carrier's employees upon passengers, where
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It might be supposed that when society lays these burdens on the
public utility business it would need to bait the inducement to the
Munns with some special reward, a higher pay, a guarantee against
losses-a cost plus ten per cent.-or some such sugaring. But no,
decidedly -no. That he is to serve under a limitation of price is the
most rigorously enforced of all the imposed duties. One wonders
why Munn is willing to finance the public utility when he can put his
money elsewhere; and one asks if he may not say to Society "Do it
yourself; do it as a government job since you fix things so that I can-
not win much and am left to shoulder all the losses." The Recapture
provisions of the 192o Transportation Act invite this reflection.2 8
To serve "all" is the first of the duties I have listed; but "all,"
unqualified, is misleading. Munn decides the "all" by what is called
his "profession" or his "holding out." Munn's refusal of service
which he has not professed has no legal significance. The applicant
was not within the "all." On the other hand if the applicant asks
what Munn does offer and Munn refuses, Munn's public utility
status makes what is in private business of no legal significance, a
legal wrong for which the customer collects damages. So far as
Munn's own idea of what is his service is concerned, the business
urge to do business takes care of the situation.
But there is a distinct field of social engineering in the matter. If
Munn is in the grain storage business, an applicant for coal trans-
portation is not in the "all" and is rightly refused; and if Munn is
running a passenger bus line, an applicant for freight transportation
is also properly refused. But let Munn get himself simply into
transportation and substantially he loses control of the situation. If
after he starts business his territory starts shipping live cattle, live
the liability is close to absolute, the formula for liability is the usual one of fault,
of "negligence." See Green, High Care and Gross Negligence (1928) 23 ILL. L.
REV. 4. But the legal doctrine called res ipsa loquitur which makes the occur-
rence of an accident speak negligence and the sympathy of juries make sub-
stantial fact of my statement. A New York lawyer long since proposed a Com-
pensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims on an insurance basis: see Ballantine
in (x916) 29 HARV. L. REv. 705. With this the working difficulty is the fraudu-
lent claim as the Massachusetts compulsory automobile insurance law warns.
After two years experience of the latter, investigation shows that in some com-
munities the loss ratio is $1.75 for each dollar of premiums taken in. Transcript,
Editorial (July I9, 1928).
281t directs the Commerce Commission to establish rates by the rate groups of
territories and if under these rates some roads make more return than a set
percentage the excess is impounded by the government. The scheme is open to
squabble at two points: what percentage to set, and, as discussed later, on what
value?
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cattle he must take and not only that, but under the duty to serve
with adequate facilities, he must supply special cars for them; if the
live cattle are milked he is in for carrying milk and in milk cars, and if
live cattle turn into dead and dressed cattle he is called on for re-
frigerator cars. Both in the "serve all" and in the "serve with ade-
quate facilities" aspects of his duties, Munn is subject to a social
engineering which reads his duty in terms of the needs of his million
and in approximation to the latest fashion in the appliances for doing
the job. His "all" expands to local needs.
When the railroads of Kansas refused live cattle the Kansas court
replied "it must be admitted that railroads might be created for the
purpose of carrying one kind of property only, or for carrying many
kinds, or for carrying all kinds of property which can be carried by
railroads, including cattle, live-stock, etc." This is all Munn's way.
But "In this state it must be presumed," the court continued, "that
they were created for the purpose of carrying all kinds of personal
property." Why? Because "As Kansas, and all the surrounding
states and territories, with their boundless prairies and nutritious
grasses, are destined to be great stock-growing countries, it can
scarcely be supposed that the legislature in providing common car-
riers for the property of the public should have omitted to provide for
one of the most important kinds of property, a vast source of un-
bounded wealth." 29
The duty to serve adequately has brought in the dining car, the
sleeping car and types of special equipment; while as to a telephone,
"We must concede that it is not only the right but the duty of the
public utility concern to discard inconvenient or obsolete apparatus
and provide the best available.30 For adequate facilities are relative
and must be interpreted in the light of the conditions . .. and the
habits and customs then prevailing." One of these habits, which has
affected the railroads especially, is the present habit of thinking of
them as a national unified system. Adequacy of their service there-
fore, builds up duties of through routes and rates, consolidation, etc.,
and the old idea that the carrier served only on his own route is pretty
well gone. The Hoch-Smith Resolution directing the Interstate
Commerce Commission to make rates with a view to conditions in
industries and in parts of the country is a very frank acceptance of
this view coupled with a definite urge toward social engineering.3'
Financial aspects of the adequate facilities duties I advert to later.-
2
'Kansas Pacific Co. v. Nichols, 9 Kan. 162 (1872).
3O0State ex rel. Tacoma v. Sunset Tel.& Tel. Co., 86 Wash. 309, 150 Pac. 427
(1915). 31See discussion of this at 24 infra.
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
To serve without discrimination was the duty first fought over;
and a desperate fight it was. It still is as to enforcement; but I am
talking of the fight to establish the theory. The battle is so recent
that the last quarter century includes the chief activity in it.12 A
people whose cutrent fetish it was to keep possible the doing of busi-
ness by small units made it a major bit of social engineering to unitize
service largely upon the level of the lesser calls for service, to see
that a utility handled each service on the same price basis. Pre-
railroad Society had seen no such importance in it3 and it is debat-
able whether at common law, that is, prior to modern conditions, there
was any duty at all not to discriminate. The now established doctrine,
however, cuts across so many modem tendencies; those toward doing
business in large units, those in which the wholesale-retail variances
are made in costs; that the attempt to set charges on the unit of the
service demanded by the lesser applicant and to hold it there without
regard to the volume of business offered by the big one has resulted in
curious compromises. In the railroad field the various shippers
whose collection of items fills a car have paid more for the carload
movement than the single shipper who ships by the carload lot; but
the trainload customer does not pay on the trainload basis. His
rate is unitized at the carload. Yet in gas and electricity etc. utili-
ties the customer comparable to the trainload customer gets train-
load rates. Possibly the final word on this matter has not been
reached.
But in another result of the fight for equality there is a firm con-
tribution and one which would not be affected by any rearrangement
of the charge units. This is the scheme of filing and publishing rates,
which merits more discussion than can be given to it here. Under its
theory a rate once filed-and as a device for equality treatment its
32See chapter "From Old to New Industry" 2 SULLIVAN, OUR T MES-AmERICA
FINDING HERSELF (1926) 254.
33White, C. J., in Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Delaware L. & W. R. R.,
220 U. S. 235, 31 Sup. Ct. 392 (19ii), "Before the act to regulate commerce it
was usual, first, to give reduced rates to persons who shipped quantities of mer-
chandise; and, second, to charge a proportionately less rate for a carload than
was asked for a shipment in less than a carload. After the act, lower rates to
wholesale shippers were abandoned, it having been declared that to continue them
was contrary to the act. Providence Coal Case, I I. C. C. Rep. 107, I Inters.
Com. Rep. 363. The giving, however, a lesser proportional rate for a carload
than for a less than carload continued, the Commission having at an early date
announced that such a practice was not prohibited. Thurber v. New York,
C. & H. R. R. Co., 3 I. C. C. Rep. 473, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 742. Without detail-
ing the theory upon which this conception was based, it suffices broadly to say
that it embodied the assumption that a carload was the unit of shipment."
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reasonableness is no part of the problem-serves as a common
denominator for all applicants who are on common ground.4 It
withdraws from the realm of "contract" 5 as between customer and
utility all question of what the customer shall pay. Operating as a
bit of mechanical jurisprudence-as a return to that period of strict
law where a rule was a rule let it operate as it might-mistake, good
faith and all the other devices for lubricating a rigid juristic machine
with mitigating circumstances have gone by the board.3"a In view of
the evils it aimed at presumably the thing is worth what it costs.
But it took a good bit of educating of both business man and lower
court before it was established that a mistake by a utility's own agent
in giving a rate on which a shipper or consignee made his selling figure
and closed his deal did not bar the utility's collecting the higher filed
rate; that a prior payment in kind or in services, or in the release of
claims for personal injuries would not bar it; that a limitation of
34The necessity for decision on whether the common ground exists has provided
the new machinery for regulation-the commission-with its greatest exclusive
field of usefulness. Brandeis, J., in Gt. Northern R. R. v. Merchants Elevator
Co., 259 U. S. 285, 42 Sup. Ct. 477, "Prelininary resort to the commission is re-
quired because the inquiry is essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical
matters; and uniformity can be secured only if its determination is left to the
commission. Moreover, that determination is reached ordinarily upon volumi-
nous and conflicting evidence, for the adequate appreciation of which acquaint-
ance is commonly fouhd only in a body of experts."
In such cases the courts refuse to hear the parties until after the commission
has acted. The clue to this judicial abdication is in the last part of the quotation,
and it is again an illustration of how practical considerations govern legal prin-
ciples. As Chief Justice Taft remarked, in his response to the resolutions of
the Bar in commemoration of Chief Justice White: "The Interstate Commerce
Commission was authorized to exercise powers the conferring of which by Con-
gress would have been, perhaps, thought in the earlier years of the Republic to
violate the rule that no legislative power can be delegated. But the inevitable
progress and exigencies of government and the utter inability of Congress to give
the time and attention indispensable to the exercise of these powers in detail
forced the modification of the rule. Similar necessity caused Congress to create
other bodies with analogous relations to the existing legislative, executive, and
judicial machinery of the Federal Government, and these in due course came
under the examination of this court. Here was a new field of administrative law
which needed a knowledge of government and an experienced understanding of
our institutions safely to define and declare. The pioneer work of Chief Justice
White in this field entitles him to the gratitude of his countrymen."
35The "freedom" was illusory in fact. Inequalityin bargaining power had made
the right merely abstract; the small shipper was not able to bargain with the
carrier, and the carrier itself was not able to bargain with the big shipper.
11aThe writer has discussed this more fully in The Filed-rate Theory: A Study
in Mechanical Jurisprudence (1928) 77 V. PA. L. REv. (December).
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liability duly filed bound a well-to-do woman whose valuable trunk
the utility lost to a one hundred dollar recovery; or that a telegraph
user could prove through a transmission error a thirty thousand
dollar damage and recover a five dollar filed limitation."
Consider now the financial aspects of the situation into which
Munn is cast. The requirement to serve at reasonable rates is the
most obvious; but the duty to serve with adequate facilities and the
duty .to continue service are also financial phases of the social en-
gineering problem of hiring Munn to serve the million. When the
rate fixing job was undertaken it was largely as a cure for discrimina-
tion. That all its implications were seen is doubtful. But it has
unfolded questions which are now most momentous, not so much on
the theory of the duty as on the meaning of "reasonable." Of this
there are two phases. What is the rate which,-in the scheme of
enforced service to John Smith as applicant,-the utility may charge
Smith for what it does, i.e., the individual rate. "Reasonable" here
is a thoroughly meaningless word which I venture to believe indicates
permission to the rate setting authority to use intelligent discretion.
It may mean reasonable from Smith's angle, from the company's, or
from the angle of the welfare of a shipping community, or of a
destination community. The guiding idea seems to be that it must be
reasonable from the company's angle, though Congress, in the Hoch-
Smith resolution seems to have views comparable to those which the
Supreme Court of the United States denied to North Dakota when it
sought to make "public welfare" the touchstone for rate-making at
the expense of the utiities. But where the utility handles many
3IThe cases are Boston & Maine R. R., v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 34 Sup. Ct.
526 (1914); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U. S. 566, 41
Sup. Ct. 584 (1921).
37Northern Pacific Ry. v. No. Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, 35 Sup. Ct. 429 (1915),
Hughes, J., "The state insists that the enactment of the statute may be justified
as 'a declaration of public policy.' In substance, the argument is that the rate
was imposed to aid in the development of a local industry, and thus to confer a
benefit upon the people of the state. The importance to the community of its
deposits of lignite coal, the infancy of the industry, and the advantages to be
gained by increasing the consumption of this coal and making the community
less dependent upon fuel supplies imported into the state, are emphasized. But,
while local interests serve as a motive for enforcing reasonable rates, it would be a
very different matter to say that the state may compel the carrier to maintain a
rate upon a particular commodity that is less than reasonable, or-as might
equally well be asserted-to carry gratuitously, in order to build up a local enter-
prise. That would be to go outside the carrier's undertaking, and outside the field
of reasonable supervision of the conduct of its business, and would be equivalent
to an appropriation of the property to public uses upon terms to which the carrier
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commodities the trail of costs is so lost in bookkeeping apportion-
ments that it seems fair to say that the courts have substantially said
to the Commissions, "You do it." Beyond generalities they have
pretty much left the latter to do what is very real social engineering,-
justice without law--i.e. without detailed rules laid by court or
legislature. To secure such action is why Commissions are.38
The country resounds just now with the other reasonable rate
question which may be stated this way: Munn serves the million for
what? He has a plant which once was uninvested money. What
does he get for that money which he devoted to the job of serving the
million? The answer is, an aggregation of payments by the million
which must amount to a "fair return." But what is a fair return;
and on what is it a return? The present quarrel is on the what. It is
the "reasonable value of the property at the time it is being used for
the public," the courts say. "Value" is the fighting word. Can it be
more than cost? Can the item in dollars in the present bookkeeping
be more dollars than Munn put in? In a famous case 9 fifteen years
ago, Mr. Justice Hughes remarked that "the making of a just return
. . . involves the recognition of its fair value if it be more than
cost.".
Since the world war, and under the purchase-power variance be-
tween the dollar of I9M3 and that of the present-day dollar, the
question has blazed into hot controversy. The Supreme Court itself
sticks to the theory that the value may be more than the cost; and it
ascertains value by the cost of reproduction, which may put more
had in no way agreed. It does not aid the argument to urge that the state may
permit the carrier to make good its loss by charges for other transportation."
Yet the commuter rates-at least where the carriers have themselves initiated
them-on social engineering grounds are required to be continued. "On the
strength of these commutation tariffs, it is a fact of public history that thousands
of persons have acquired homes in city suburbs and nearby towns in reliance upon
this action of the carriers in fixing special rates and furnishing particular accom-
modations suitable to the traffic", Pa. R. R. v. Towers, 245 U. S. 6, 38 Sup. Ct. 2
(1917).
38This general process is described by Charles B. Hughes as "personal govern-
ment;" and of the commissions he says, "Useful as are these instrumentalities of
government they represent to a striking degree a prevalent desire to do without
law." Address, June 21, 192o, quoted from Boston Transcript of that date.
But, on the other hand "The Commission and the utility are not dealing with a
purely legal proposition subject to inflexible rules of law, but with an ever-
changing economic life ... which, so far, courts or legislatures have not been
able to control" says the court in Coplay Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 271 Pa.
58, II4 Atl. 649 (1921).
9Minesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1913).
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dollars into the present bookkeeping or fewer; just now, more. Mr.
Justice Brandeis dissents. The cost of reproduction, he says, is an
elaborate and unverifiable fabric of guesswork for one thing, and it is
up today and down tomorrow; prudent investment is a matter of
historical record and it is also a constant, he says. 40 No doubt he is
right on every point. But the social engineering which will induce
Munn to serve the million with contentment is one that should take
account of what Munn sees that he may do elsewhere with his
money. Outside the public utility field he may get the profits of
inflation-also the losses of deflation; and he prefers, since he fights
for it, the sporting chance which the Supreme Court gives him.
"Values of utility properties fluctuate and owners must bear the de-
cline and are entitled to the increase," it says in a case where
the State of Indiana had not given the ups in the present
inflation.
This Indianapolis Water Case4' decided that spot reproduction
was a constitutionally obligatory method of reaching the "value."
But it was a reading of the prohibitions laid down by the Fourteenth
Amendment on states., On that last word hangs a tale. For in a test
case involving Federal railway valuations, the Interstate Commerce
Commission so reads its mandate as to authorize it to use its own
discretion, and it has looked to the dissenting Justice, Brandeis, for
its theory. Its result varies by ten to twelve billion dollars from the
figures which the railroads reached under the court's theory in the
Indianapolis Water Case; and the Supreme Court has coming to it
therefore in this O'Fallon Railway litigation the "biggest lawsuit in
history."4'
40His discussion in South Western Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 262
U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544 (1923) is the classic exposition of the subject.
41McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144 (1926),
is much criticized. A note in (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 721 calls it an "error which
must be corrected." The other cases are collected in the writer's, The Valu-
ation War (1928) 6 N. C. L. REv. 243, wherein is discussed in detail the whole
topic of reasonable rates as handled in recent decisions.
42It has been set down for argument on Jan. 2, 1929. The record title is "Excess
Income of St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co." and it is strictly a recapture case
under section i~a of the Commerce Act which requires that the commission
shall "determine what percentage of such aggregate property value shall con-
stitute a fair return" in which it may utilize the results of its work under section
19a, but the main purpose of section 15 is not rate maldng but to "adequately
sustain all the carriers" and the aim was to secure the impounding of the excess
over the "fair return" as a trust fund to be used by the commission in loans etc.,
to the carriers.
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Because railways are in question;" because not the Fourteenth, but
the Fifth Amendment limiting the Federal government, is in question;
because recapture and not rate making is in question, there are those
who see differentiations from the Water Case. The amendments
meant exactly the same thing when the issue was the social engineer-
ing job of declaring housing a public business." As to railroads being
different, inducing Munn to put his money into them is merely a phase
of the inducement to investment which is a common problem as to all
the utilities. The Commerce Commission specifically felt that its
task though pigeonholed under Section 15, the recapture section of the
Interstate Commerce Act, was a general job under Section 19, the
Valuation Act; and said so.
Other phases of the valuation question are the allowances for
intangible values, today's allowances for investments made not for
today's use but as provision for tomorrow; the figure which is used as a
multiplier for the total, "the fair rate of return." Setting the "fair
rate" is frank social engineering. For its theory is that Munn must
get the "going rate" i.e. that "going" now and it is equated to other re-
turns in the money market. The point is clear that Munn's money is
lured into the public utility field in competition with the wages of
money elsewhere."
This total, arrived at by a "value" multiplied by "rate of return"
is a thing to keep in mind in considering the extent of the utility's
410n this see Goddard, The Problem of Valuation; The Evolution of Cost of
Reproduction as the Rate Base (1928) 41 HARV. L.REv. 564, and Bonbright, The
Economic Merits of Original Cost and Reproduction Cost, ibid. 593. At 589 Mr.
Goddard argues the differences between local utilities and the railroads; and at
593 Mr. Bonbright adopts the argument.
44The cases arose from New York and from the District of Columbia and the de-
cisions made no distinction: see Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458
(1921), and Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct.
465 (192r).
46Bluefields Water Works Co. v. Public Service Comm., 262 U. S. 679, 692,
43 Sup. Ct. 675 (1923). "What annual rate will constitute just compensation
depends upon many circumstances and must be determined by the exercise of a fair
and enlightened judgment having regard to all the facts ... equal to that general-
ly being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country, on
investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding
risks and uncertainties.. .reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the finan-
cial soundness of the utility and should be adequate under efficient and economical
management to maintain and support its credit. . .rate of return may be reason-
able at one time and become too high or low by changes affecting opportunities
for investment, the money market and business generally." All these formulas
are in the same opinion.
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other duties. In the duty to continue service it is dominating.
There is no duty to serve at a less figure, for then the public to which
the interest was "dedicated" has declined the dedication. This
would seem obvious enough, but the modern Munn who goes into
the public utility field is a corporation. A corporation has a charter,
a mystical something granted by the state which makes a legal one,
a juristic person, out of many natural persons;and a charter nowadays
recites that the many may be one for a stated number of years. In a
Texas instance it has twenty-five. But the country served boomed
and bloomed and "busted" within nineteen years. Had the utility
"contracted" to go twenty-five years regardless of its income in the
last six? The ever hopeful remnant of population, whose service
demands admittedly would not finance the service they insisted on
having, said yes; and the Texas courts agreed. "No," said the Federal
Supreme Court ;46 if the whole enterprise does not yield the fair return,
Society cannot insist on the service. Here is a case where Munn can
say "The laborer is worthy of his hire. If you must have the service
let the government do it. Or let it subsidize me." Whether Munn's
charter is "mandatory "or is "permissive," words that are used,
seems in the actual decisions to make no real difference.4 7 A dead
horse simply will not run.
Keeping your mind on the whole return on the whole enterprise,
consider it now as a sort of strong back. If it is as a whole a "fair
return," what may be loaded on it and how far? If one is in private
business and is keen at it he knows (i) what each particular com-
modity produces in profit or in red ink, (2) what branch stores of the
chain system are paying their way, (3) what the particular facilities
he offers to his public cost and what they are worth to him in the
whole volume of his business. As to red ink producers he says "off
with their heads," and he does it on his accounting as to the items
involved. He would be astonished if he were told he must go on with
the losing items because on his whole volume of business he is doing
well. Trimming the lean from the fat and keeping the fat is the thing
for him.
How fares Munn in the public utility business? Consider first the
income from this or that commodity. If a commission sets a rate for
coal, say, which is below the cost of handling coal does the rate
stand so long as the total from passengers, wheat, lumber, auto-
mobiles and coal, all added together, shows a fair return? May
46Railroad Comm. v. East Texas R. R., 264 U. S. 79, 44 Sup. Ct. 247 (1924).
47See Field, The Withdrawal from Public Service of the Public Utilities Com-
panies (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 169.
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social engineering wrapped up in the vague phrase "public welfare"
require him to carry coal at the set figure? So far the United States
Supreme Court has made compromises: it said no to such a lignite-
coal rate; it said no to such a passenger rate;48 but when an industrious
railroad pleaded for a higher figure per mile from patrons who
travelled over a mountain division than from those who travelled
on the flat plains, where both original construction and current
maintenance costs were less, it said no to that too.
In the grand division passenger versus freight the idea is graspable
that neither can by public authority be made a charge on the com-
bination, but beyond that where draw the line? Must not there be
some social welfare in the formula for setting rates for low classifica-
tion stuff of bulky character?49 As it stands, Munn is left consider-
ably in the dark as to details. But as to publicly set rates, he may
keep books on at least his main divisions of traffic, and resist the rates
for them if loss results. If under higher rates the traffic wont move at
all the answer apparently is that. it does not move, unless the utility
of its own motion chooses to buy good-will by offering low rates. How
far the other traffic may be charged by the carrier itself with the costs
of this purchase is not clear.
The urge to make rates in terms of social welfare seems humanly
inevitable as one considers transportation's "make or break" effect
upon industries and localities. Shipping communities and destina-
tion communities alike are involved. Shall rates on coal be based
on the imperative needs imposed by the climate of its New England
destination, or based on the needs of the mining areas which mine and
ship the coal? Shall California and Florida be given rates with the
view to building up their citrus fruit production? Shall industries
not localized by climate, as in the last sentence, get assistance in the
form of freight rates toward localizing themselves here or there?
Shall the New England cotton mill industry, now suffering from the
rise of a similar industry in the cotton states themselves, be given
48The coal case is cited supra note 37. In Norfolk & W. Ry. v. West Virginia,
236 U. S. 6o5, 35 Sup. Ct. 437 (1915) Hughes, J., remarked, "It is clear that by
the reduction in rates the company is forced to carry passengers if not at or below
cost, with merely a nominal reward ... We find no basis whatever upon which
the rate can be supported."
49This is developed in Bye, Social Welfare in Rate Making (1917) 32 POL. ScI.
Q. 522; Dunn, Railroad Efficiency in its Relation to an Advance in Rates (1915)
23 JOUR. POL. ECON. 128; Public Interest Justifying Confiscatory Rates (1915) 13
MICH. L. REv. 676, a note discussing the case of No. P. R. R. v. N. D., 236 U. S.
585, 35 Sup. Ct. 429 (1915). See also the notes (1915) 15 COL. L. REv. 441;
(1915) 28 HARv. L. REv. 683; (1915) 63 U. PA. L. REv. 551.
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
"adjusted compensation" by reductions on cotton freights? In this
lies a colossal inquiry as to national economies in production and
distribution for the million.
If the railroads were government owned, one senses the infinite
amount of political scrambling for favoritism which the idea might
throw into their management. How merry the game of hiding the
losses in the general tax bills! If a single privately-owned and pub-
licly-regulated road served the whole country, the same scrambling
is visionable, as is the need for subsidizing the road if it were to be
kept going as a private affair. Yet even as things are now in this
country, we have lately had in the Hoch-Smith resolution an attempt
to handle rate making for the privately-owned and multiple roads
with consideration of the conditions in "the several industries" and
"parts of the country. "50 So far only deplorable results have followed
from this very large project in social engineering 5 largely, perhaps,
because it appeared to be a new form of "pork." But it is an idea
which will scarcely be dropped.
50The Resolution which dates from 1925 declared that the freight rate policy
should Consider conditions "in the several industries" and "parts of the country,"
directing for farm products "the lowest possible rates." The policy injected
politics and sectionalism into rate making. The commission's attempt to give it
meaning has resulted in a long warfare over the marketing of soft coal as between
the southern and northern fields shipping to the Great Lakes, and the com-
mission's latest order has been upset in Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F.
(2d.) 462 (S. D. W. Va. 1928). See The Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy (1928)
34 W. VA. L. Q. 202, 272.
SThe reference is to the attempt of certain sections of the country to pack the
commission with their partizans (see 69 CONG. REC. 2787, 2859, 2967, 3789
[i928]) and particularly to the Senate refusal to confirm the reappointment of Com-
missioner Esch. Of the latter the RAILWAY AGE tho not always friendly to the
Commission says in Vol. 84 at 662: "The action is most unwise because it makes
successful the worst example on record of the injection of both politics and sec-
tionalism into federal railway regulation... On the theory which underlies the
entire policy of federal regulation the commission is much more competent than
Congress to decide how rates should be adjusted to make them reasonable, non-
discriminatory and adapted to causing the provision of adequate transportation.
... If it is not wise for Congress to tell the commission specifically how it should
regulate rates, it is clearly much less wise for it to tell the commission how it shall
regulate rates, and for the Senate to begin chopping off the heads of members
of the commission when they have begun to regulate in accordance with what
they understand to be the special instructions given them by Congress. What
man of ability and independence of character will want to be a member of the
commission if this is the way Congress is going to do? What will federal regu-
lation become if men of ability and independence refuse to become members of
the commission?"
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In the duty to continue service we dealt heretofore with the problem
of the deficient total income. It may arise from "bad business"
pervading the whole system, as in the Texas case, and to it, the law
gives a business man's answer. Assume now that good business on the
main line and bad business on the branches adds to the fair return
figure on the whole undertaking. A chain store grocery system would
drop off the branch stores. But the public utility business' duty to
continue service bars its doing that. The option is not Munn's; the
regulation imposed upon him makes a petitioner for authority to drop
the branch. As I read the cases he is entitled to the granting of the peti-
tion only when the bleeding at the branch is so heavy that the fair
return on the whole enterprise is affected.5 2 Short of general anaemia,
the branch is a charge on the system. Let those who seek logic explain
this after what I have just said as to rates. I see it again as social
engineering.
So far also as the ordering of new facilities is concerned the general
answer seems to be that they are a charge likewise on the total return.
It is in itself a ticklish bit of social engineering to decide that the
time has come to reinterpret "adequate facilities in the light of
conditions existing at the time . . . and the habits and customs
prevailing." "Facilities for traveling which might have been con-
sidered entirely adequate and convenient fifty years ago would
certainly not be so regarded now. The introduction and general use
by railroad companies of parlor cars, sleeping cars, dining cars, and
vestibule trains have made a public necessity of what would formerly
have been considered a great luxury. But a sleeping car, for the
accommodation of travelers by day can scarcely be regarded as a
reasonably necessary facility for their accommodation." Of the
financial aspect the Supreme Court has said, "Providing reasonably
adequate facilities . . . requires an expenditure of money of
course," but "the facilities have a real bearing on the rates" and
"Therefore an enforced discharge of the duty . . . does not amount
to a taking of property without compensation merely because it is
6Southern Ry. v. Hatchett, 174 Ky. 463, 192 S. W. 694 (1917). "It will
thus be seen that the cases upon the subject can easily be divided into two distinct
classes, presenting entirely different legal principles: (i) Those cases in which
the company owning the entire railroad has become bankrupt and is without
means or credit to reinstate itself; and (2) those cases in which it is proposed
to abandon the unprofitable part of a road belonging to a profitable system.
In the first class, the abandonment is sometimes justified and will be permitted
from the very necessities of the case; in the second class of cases it is not justified
and will not be permitted, in any case, except at the permission of the state."
'Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. v. Public Service Commission, 78 W. Va. 667,
89 S. E. 844 (1916).
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attended with some expense.' ' Yet it adds that "the expense is an
important element in deciding whether the requirement is within the
bounds of reasonable regulation," and it is again a question of loading
the strong back. "To compel (such) . . . enlargements or exten-
sion that the proprietor of a utility could not make a fair return upon
the whole investment would certainly be depriving him of his prop-
erty without due process of law."55
After this airplane view of a large subject, a thought or two may be
ventured. The first is the hopelessness of making any assertions of
finality. All that has been sketched is of the last fifty years at most,
much of it of the last twenty-five. In no single particular is the
change of living conditions in America so quickly reflected as in the
attitude of Society to those industries which it conceives essential to
its well being, and one recoils from declaring that living conditions are
stabilized. The other thought is that Society's present attitude
could not be translated into effective action without the commission
as the agency for the control of public utilities which the attitude
calls for. Aside from the merits of the Hoch-Smith resolution already
alluded to, the legislative bullying of the best established of all our
commissions which it'induced is a serious blow to the whole fabric of
utility regulation.
In conclusion: if there is detected here an underlying sympathy for
Munn, in that Society loads him with special duties while leaving to
other business men a larger measure of self seeking, there remains a
thought which will go toward evening up the score. In the birth
control already mentioned, Society makes a special bribe to Munn
which it does not offer to those in the "private" businesses. Though
it limits Munn's profits it gives him a special fenced off area in which
to earn them. From it competitors are shooed away;" and the com-
sVandevanter, J., in Chicago and N. W. Ry. v. Ochs, 249 U. S. 416, 39 Sup.
Ct. 343 (1919).
55McCarthy, J., in Murray v. P. U. Comm., 27 Idaho, 603, 15o Pac. 47 (1913).
"In order to justify the Commission in ordering enlargements, the Commis-
sion should be satisfied from the evidence: First, that the existing plant is not
reasonably sufficient to render adequate service (Washington ex rel. Ore. R. &
Nay. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 5io); second, that the extension or enlargement
is within the scope of the original professed undertaking of the proprietor of
the utility, (N. P. R. Co. v. N. D., 236 U. S. 585); third, that, after the making
of the enlargements or extensions, the owner will be insured a fair return upon
his whole investment (Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466-546, Ct. Rep. 418); fourth,
that the particular enlargements or extensions are reasonably necessary to insure
reasonably adequate service (N. P. R. R. v. N. D., supra note 49, and Wash-
ington ex rel. Ore. R. & Nav. Co. v. Fairchild, supra.)"
'uThe definition of "trespassers" is not, however, sufficiently inclusive to says
the Munn who has, we shall say, put his money into street cars, when bus linee
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missions which grant or withhold the certificates of public convenience
show an increasing regard for what might be termed the invested
interest of the first in the field . 7
This making a population tributary to the utility is the latter's
compensation for the duties; enforcement of the duties safeguards
the population from the rapacities of monopoly while they enjoy its
efficiencies and economies. To me it seems a sensible compromise
for keeping private initiative in fields wherein growth is constant and
wherein no private concern under intelligent regulation is likely to
"rob the people" so much as they are likely to rob themselves under
public ownership.
come; or if into canals and river boats, when railroads come. The private enter-
priser of course also runs the hazard of that social engineering'by which society
insists on service by the better equipment; but in his day of profit making he is
under no intake limitation in any legal sense and Munn is.
57In Illinois Power and Light Corp. v. Commerce Comm., 320 Ill. 427, 151
N. E. 236 (1926), the court upset an order of the commission which let in the in-
vader. See the note to it in (1926) 24 MicH. L. REv. 393 on Policy as to Compe-
tition between Utilities.
That a railroad's later application for a certificate to supply bus service in its
territory should be preferred over a prior requestfor one by a specially organized
bus concern was decided in Monongahela etc. Co. v. State Road Comm., io4
W. Va. 183, 139 S. E. 744 (1927), noted (1928) 6 N. C. L. REv. 347; (1928) 76
U. PA. L. REV. 456; (1928) 34 W. VA. L. Q. x98.
Of a famous case holding that grants of privileges from the State are strictly
construed the court said "That case was decided in 1837. Then 'Competition is
the life of trade' was accepted as a guiding maxim of economics. That maxim
has long since been rejected so far as it applies to public utilities. Uncontrolled
competition is now regarded as destructive of such utilities. In 1837 the state
watched with indifference one public utility stifle another. Now the state controls
iti public utilities, and, as an incident to its regulatory power, acknowledges a
duty to protect them. As a part of that protection, the state now guards against
unnecessary duplication of public utilities. Consequently, the decision in the
Bridge Case is not applicable to cases like these, where regulated utilities are con-
cerned."
"The argument of the railroads has met the approval of court and commission.
'Railroads have permanent roadbeds and trackage which require an outlay of
millions of dollars and which in turn yield large revenue to the people of the
state. The average bus line is incorporated for a comparatively small sum.
The railroad is of vastly greater financial responsibility. This is a matter of
substantial public interest, particularly in cases of accident. It is the established
policy of the law in this state that a public utility be allowed to earn a fair return
on its investments. It is therefore not only unjust but poor economy to grant
to a much less responsible utility company the right to compete for the business
of carrying passengers by paralleling its line, unless it appears that the necessary
service cannot be furnished by such railroad. Appellants offer to provide what-
ever increase in accommodations and service is deemed essential to meet the public
convenience and necessity. It is but consonant with our law regulating public
utilities that they be given opportunity to do so."'
